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Summary
The mind-body problem has been a major concern of philosophers. Since the time of 
the Renaissance, scientists dealing with the problems of the natural world also joined 
in the discussion. This article looks at the contributions of two important figures of 
18th–century natural philosophy, namely Joseph Priestley and Ruđer Josip Bošković. It 
is a well-known fact that Priestley’s solution to this problem antagonized his colleague 
from Dubrovnik. Less known, however, are the religious or spiritual reasons why he 
used Bošković’s notion of unextended points of matter as the basis of his solution. 
After presenting these reasons and establishing their connections with a specific set 
of presuppositions underlying monist systems of thought, the present article looks at 
Bošković’s own solution that assumes a dualistic view of human nature, a solution 
relying on his notions of forces relative to the distances between unextended points, 
center of gravity and compenetration as discussed in his Theoria philosophiae natu-
ralis, redacta ad unicam legem virium in natura existentium (1763). 
Keywords: Ruđer Josip Bošković, Joseph Priestley, mind-body problem, monism, 
dualism, notion of the soul, structure of the material world.
The mind-body problem has been a major concern of philosophers. For 
many of them, this concern was not just about the pleasure to speculate on 
human nature or exercising their ability to debate, but rather it was about de-
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fending their very way of life. For instance, the Cārvākas1 were of the opinion 
that the mind was just an epiphenomenon emerging from the interplay of four 
basic material components, namely, earth, water, fire and air, in a way similar 
to the production of red saliva when chewing a betel leaf, areca nuts and lime.2 
This view allowed them to deny the reality of ideas like the reincarnation of 
the soul and to negate the efficacy of rituals, of good actions or anything that 
presupposes the existence of a life after death, a life that we can earn if we 
sacrifice our life in this world. In other words, they would say that any belief 
or view that can be used as a pretext to limit the autonomy of people wishing 
to honestly enjoy their material existence should be refuted.
Considering the development of Western philosophy since the Renaissance, 
this concern took a different turn in light of our increasing knowledge about 
the principles regulating the material world. By assuming more and more that 
the evolution of this world is determined by specific laws, that our universe 
is inanimate and purposeless, philosophers started to seriously investigate the 
nature of what we call the mind and, more particularly, how such an entity is 
connected with the material body.
In the early period of this development, we have the groundbreaking con-
tribution of the French philosopher René Descartes, who proposed a model 
in which the mind and body are two fundamentally different types of entity. 
Despite their irreconcilable nature, Descartes nevertheless assumed that these 
two entities must be somehow connected. His assumption was based on an 
observation of a man who, after he had lost his limb, claimed that he could 
feel it after having his nerves stimulated. On account of this, Descartes thought 
that the center of the interaction between the mind and the body must be in the 
brain, more specifically, in the pineal gland.
Descartes’s assertion gives us the possibility to test a theory by doing 
what would qualify as scientific experiments. We should note that, by negating 
the existence of such a physical space as the locus of the interaction between 
the mind and the body, we are somehow compelled to limit our exploration 
of this problem to metaphysical speculations only. Or, as will be discussed 
later, we could circumvent the problem by negating the reality of one of the 
two entities by saying that one entity is the product of the other. On the basis 
of such a monist or reductionist model, we can investigate, as it is now done 
by using sophisticated instruments like brain scanners or such techniques as 
1 The members of an ancient school of Indian materialism.
2 Sarvasiddhāntasamgraha. Cited in Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, A Sourcebook in Indian 
Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 235.
Hereafter in notes: Radhakrishnan, A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy (1973).
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neuroimaging, the behavior of the brain in order to determine how it affects 
faculties usually attributed to the mind, for instance, emotions, motivation, 
thinking processes, etc.
However, if we decide to keep a dualistic view of the mind and body in 
which these two entities are inherently different realities, one possible model 
of explanation is to say that the behavior of the body is coordinated with that 
of the mind without having a real contact between the two. As examples of 
such models, we have Nicolas Malebranche’s theory called Occasionalism, 
Leibnitz’s Pre-established Harmony, or Spinoza’s Parallelism. Contrary, but 
somewhat similar to the monist models which negate the existence of one of the 
two entities, these models are bypassing the problem of the connection between 
the mind and the body by negating the possibility of any connection. Needless 
to say, such models leave no room for scientific experimentation as they are not 
based on any observation whatsoever and consequently cannot be contradicted.
This brief discussion on the problem of the connection between the mind 
and the body finally brings us to the topic of this article. Ruđer Josip Bošković 
was very much concerned by this problem as he clearly stated in the “Appendix 
ad metaphysicam pertinens de anima et Deo” to his major work entitled Theoria 
philosophiae naturalis published for the first time in 1758 and later in 1763: 
“Here I will first of all consider more fully this distinction [i.e. distinction 
between the mind and matter]; & I will add something with regard to the mind 
itself, the force of its actions, & its nature; these are closely connected with the 
very theme of this work.”3 
As will be seen, Bošković, while maintaining the dualistic view of man, tried 
to identify, on the basis of some of the ideas developed in his Theoria, the ways 
a mind might be able to influence the activity of a body and vice versa. Like 
3 “Appendix ad metaphysicam pertinens de anima, et Deo,” in Rogerius Joseph Boscovich, 
Theoria philosophiae naturalis, redacta ad unicam legem virium in natura existentium, editio 
Veneta prima (Venetiis: Ex Typographia Remondiniana, 1763), nn. 525–558 on pp. 248–263, 
in n. 525 on p. 248: 
“Hic primum, et id ipsum discrimen [= discrimen animæ a materia] evolvam magis, et 
addam de ipsius animæ, et ejus actuum vi, ac natura, nonnulla, quæ cum eodem operis 
argumento arctissime connectuntur: <…>.” 
Hereafter in notes: Boscovich, Theoria (1763).
Cf. “Appendix Relating to Metaphysics: The Mind and God,” in A Theory of Natural Phi-
losophy put forward and explained by Roger Joseph Boscovich, S.J., English edition from the 
text of the first Venetian edition (1763), translation by J. M. Child (Cambridge, Massachussets, 
and London, England: The M.I.T. Press, 1966), p. 187.
Hereafter in notes: Boscovich, A Theory of Natural Philosophy (1966).
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Descartes and contrary to the other philosophers mentioned above, Bošković 
wanted to go beyond metaphysical speculations by giving an explanation that 
still tries to identify a physical connection or an acting force between the mind 
and the body. 
There is another important philosopher of the eighteenth century worth 
mentioning in this regard. He is even more interesting to refer to as he used 
one of Bošković’s ideas as a key element of his solution to the mind-body 
problem. However, the solution he suggested was entirely different than that 
of Bošković, not to mention that it was motivated by quite a different purpose. 
That philosopher is Joseph Priestley (1733–1804), better-known today for 
his discovery of the oxygen than for his philosophical investigations on the 
mind-body problem. Nonetheless, this Englishman could be considered as the 
precursor of the materialist view of human nature that shapes modern research 
on the brain and mind.4 Ironically, we may say that it was possible for Priestley 
to formulate such a view by using an idea from someone who wore many hats 
but that of a materialist.
Priestley vs. Bošković: The End of a Friendship
Almost twenty years after the first publication of Bošković’s Theoria 
philosophiae naturalis, Joseph Priestley published his Disquisitions relating 
to Matter and the Spirit (first edition in 1777, the second in 1782), in which he 
outlined his materialistic view of the world. In order to disprove the dualistic 
explanation of the nature of man, he made use of Bošković’s points of matter. 
He argued that these points account for the properties we usually attribute to 
the spirit or the soul. Indeed, in the Preface of his Disquisitions he says:
“Father Boscovich and Mr. Michell’s new theory concerning matter, of which 
I gave an account in my The History of Discoveries Relating to Vision &c. was 
4 Three of Priestley’s works particularly deal with the questions related to the nature of the 
soul. These are: An examination of Dr. Reid’s Inquiry into the human mind on the principles of 
common sense; Dr. Beattie’s Essay on the nature and immutability of truth, and Dr. Oswald’s 
Appeal to common sense in behalf of religion (London: [s. e.], 1775), Hartley’s Theory of the 
Human Mind: On the Principle of the Association of Ideas; with Essays Relating to the Subject 
of it (London: Printed for J. Johnson, 1777), and Disquisitions relating to matter and spirit: to 
which is added, The history of the philosophical doctrine concerning the origin of the soul, and 
the nature of matter; with its influence on Christianity, especially with respect to the doctrine of 
the pre-existence of Christ (London: Printed for J. Johnson, 1777). 
Hereafter in notes: Priestley, An examination of Dr. Reid’s Inquiry into the human mind on 
the principles of common sense (1775); Priestley, Hartley’s Theory of the Human Mind (1775); 
Priestley, Disquisitions relating to matter and spirit (1777).
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calculated, as will be seen, to throw the greatest light on the constituent principles 
of human nature.”5
Bošković was highly dissatisfied with Priestley’s recuperation by qualifying 
it as a “terrible calumny.”6 He felt that he was being dragged into the camp of 
the materialists who hold views that he later decried in French translation of 
his epic Les Éclipses:
“In the first book [i.e. first part of the Theoria], I show the essential difference 
between my points and the spirits. I discussed even in more detail, in Appendix de 
anima et Deo, something that reveals how far I am from the view of materialism, 
a view that I abhor and consider without substance and ungodly.”7 
Without naming it explicitly, Bošković seemed to have been already aware of 
the spread of materialism among his colleagues at the time of publishing his 
Theoria, as he wrote in 1758 in his dedication to Christopher Count de Migazzi, 
the archbishop of Vienna:
“This is what we have seen for a long time taking place, by some unhappy decree 
of adverse fate, all over Europe; and, as the canker spreads at an ever-increasing 
rate, young men, who have been made to imbibe principles that counterfeit the 
truth but are actually most pernicious doctrines, do not think that they have 
attained to wisdom until they have banished from their minds all thoughts of 
religion and of God, the All-wise Founder and Supreme Head of the Universe.”8
5 Priestley, Disquisitions relating to matter and spirit (1777), p. xii.
Cf. Željko Marković, Ruđe Bošković, Prvi dio (Zagreb: Jugoslavenska akademija znanosti 
i umjetnosti, 1968), p. 461. 
On first mention of Boscovich and Michell in Priestley’s The History and Present State of 
Discoveries Relating to Vision, Light, and Colours (1772) see Ivica Martinović, Ruđer Bošković 
and the Royal Society (London: Royal Society, 2011), in the chapter “Joseph Priestley and three 
Presidents of Royal Society,” pp. 68–75, on p. 68.
6 “Une calomnie atroce.” This expression was used in the letter Bošković wrote to Priestley 
on 17 October 1778. Cf. Vladimir Varićak, “Drugi ulomak Boškovićeve korespondencije,” Rad 
JAZU 193 (1912), pp. 163–338, on p. 209.
Hereafter in notes: Varićak, “Drugi ulomak Boškovićeve korespondencije” (1912).
7 Roger Joseph Boscovich, Les Éclipses, poême en six chants dédié à sa Majesté, traduit 
en François par M. l’Abbé de Barruel (Paris: Chez Valade et Laporte, 1779), note 7 on p. 534: 
“Dans le premier livre, je démontre la différence essentielle qu’il y a entre mes points & les 
esprits; mais j’y mis un Appendix de anima & Deo, qui l’exprime encore plus, & et qui fait 
voir combien je suis éloigné de l’opinion du Matérialisme que je déteste & que je regarde 
comme insubsistante & impie.”
8 My translation to English.
Cf. Boscovich, Theoria (1763), on the difference between matter and spirit in nn. 153–165 
on pp. 69–76.
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Through their mutual contact, Lord Shelburne, who was Priestley’s patron, 
Bošković requested that Priestley withdraw his affirmations. If he failed to do so, 
Bošković felt that he was obligated to publish in newspapers what he believed 
to be an affront to his reputation as well as an insult to his faith. In a letter dated 
19 August 1778, Priestley regretted that Bošković did not write directly to him 
and most importantly, he reproached him his “very inconsiderate and violent 
step which, without any provocation” he has undertaken against him.9 Priestley 
ended his letter by saying: 
“I am, not without respect, but with much less than formerly.”10
Bošković replied to Priestley:
“He should be excused for the tone of his language in his letter and that to Lord 
Shelburne, but, when it comes to defending my honour and my faith, there are 
never expressions that are too strong.”11 
He finished his own letter with the Latin sentence: “Amicus usque ad aras.”12
This fallout between Priestley and Bošković could have been avoided and, 
perhaps the ideological and social circumstances having been different, may 
have resulted in a less passionate and more constructive exchange between 
these two great thinkers since the scientific speculations of the former were 
not that far from the insights of the latter. Let’s first look at Priestley’s ideas 
so that we could see where he took a “wrong turn”—in the eyes of Bošković, 
Boscovich, Theoria (1763), in “Epistola auctoris dedicatoria primae editionis Viennensis,” 
pp. VI–XII, on pp. IX–X: 
“quod quidem jam dudum tristi quodam Europæ fato passim evenire cernimus, gliscente in 
dies malo, ut fucatis quibusdam, profecto perniciosissimis, imbuti principiis juvenes, tum 
demum sibi sapere videantur, cum et omnem animo religionem, et Deum ipsum sapienti-
ssimum Mundi Fabricatorem, atque Moderatorem sibi mente excusserint.” 
Cf. Boscovich, A Theory of Natural Philosophy (1966), p. 6.
9 Priestley to Bošković, 19 August 1778, in Varićak, “Drugi ulomak Boškovićeve kore-
spondencije” (1912), p. 207.
10 Priestley to Bošković, 19 August 1778, in Varićak, “Drugi ulomak Boškovićeve kore-
spondencije” (1912), p. 207.
11 Bošković to Priestley, 17 October 1778, in Varićak, “Drugi ulomak Boškovićeve kore-
spondencije” (1912), p. 210:
“Je vous demande pardon des expressions, que j’ai employées dans cette lettre, et dans 
la précédente à Milord: il n’y en a pas d’assés fortes, quand il s’agit de mettre à l’abri ma 
religion et mon honneur.”
12 Bošković to Priestley, 17 October 1778, in Varićak, “Drugi ulomak Boškovićeve kore-
spondencije” (1912), p. 210, with the meaning ‘Friend up to the altar’ or ‘Friend, except in what 
is contrary to one’s religion.’
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of course—before we present the latter’s own solution to the problem of the 
connection between the mind and the body.
Priestley’s Monist View of the Soul and Body
In the Preface of his Disquisitions relating to Matter and Spirit, Priestley 
confessed that, just until a few years before writing this work, he had not given 
any thoughts about the question regarding the connection between the spirit 
and the body. Like many Christians of his time, he took for granted that man 
had a soul distinct from his body and added: 
“Though with many modern divines, I supposed it to be incapable of exerting 
any of its faculties, independently upon the body; and I believed this soul to be 
a substance so intirely distinct from matter, as to have no property in common 
with it.”13 
But at some point, doubts arose in his mind regarding the possibility of an inti-
mate union of two substances that are defined as completely heterogeneous. He 
struggled with this problem and came to postulate that the distinction between 
material and immaterial as part of a model of explanation is superfluous. Not 
being able to progress in his metaphysical investigations, Priestley “relapsed 
into the general hypothesis of two intirely different and independent principles 
in man, connected in some unknown and incomprehensible manner.”14 And, as 
he added, not with some resignation, “I acquiesced in it as well as I could.”15
Although Priestley did not find a solution to the problem of the union 
between a soul/spirit/mind and a body, he nevertheless was able to identify its 
nature, namely, the tendency to resolve it without questioning its underlying 
dualist assumption. If we reject that assumption, one line of reasoning presents 
itself. One of the two horns of the dilemma has to be reduced to the other to 
end up with a monist view of the world. This means that one reality has to be 
interpreted in terms of the other reality.
If we maintain the dualistic assumption, however, we have to introduce a 
new principle that encompasses these two realities. This second line of reasoning 
usually consists in the contextualization of a dualism where each conflicting 
interpretation is true relative to its own field of application. This is done with 
an understanding that the parts that are contextualized and the whole that con-
textualizes are realities that have their own characteristics and properties. As 
13 Priestley, Disquisitions relating to matter and spirit (1777), p. xi.
14 Priestley, Disquisitions relating to matter and spirit (1777), p. xii. Italics are Priestley’s.
15 Priestley, Disquisitions relating to matter and spirit (1777), p. xii.
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will be shown, this second line of reasoning corresponds to Bošković’s view of 
the world as presented in his Theoria philosophiae naturalis (1763).
This is, however, not the path Priestley is following here. Indeed, even 
before publishing his Disquisitions, he was already convinced that this dualism 
had to be resolved by assuming only one uniform substance to explain the nature 
of man. More precisely, he said in a paragraph quoted from his early works:16 
“I am rather inclined to think, though the subject is beyond our comprehension 
at present, that man does not consist of two principles so essentially different 
from one another as matter and spirit, which are always described as having 
no one common property, by means of which they can affect, or act upon each 
other; the one occupying space, and the other not only not occupying the least 
imaginable portion of space, but incapable of bearing any relation to it; inso-
much that, properly speaking, my mind is no more in my body, than it is in the 
moon. I rather think that the whole man is of some uniform composition; and 
that the property of perception, as well the other powers that are termed mental 
is the result (whether necessary, or not) of such an organical structure as that of 
the brain: consequently, that the whole man becomes extinct at death, and that 
we have no hope of surviving the grave, but what is derived from the scheme 
of revelation.”17
The above quotation confirms that somehow Priestley a priori decided what 
he was looking for as a solution. It is therefore in this context that Bošković’s 
notion of unextended points was introduced in England. Thus, with this notion, 
Priestley’s original doubts “were instantly converted into a full persuasion.”18 
It somehow gave him the confidence to face the charges of atheism and unbe-
liever that were raised against him as a result of the publication of the passage 
just quoted. Priestley was now ready, with a firmer intention, to show that “we 
shall find ourselves intirely unauthorized to admit any thing in man besides 
that body which is the object of our senses.”19 What was then Priestley’s mo-
tivation in challenging a view of man so central to Christianity? An answer to 
this question should further highlight the reasons why Bošković did not quite 
appreciate having his theory on matter associated to Priestley’s promotion of 
what amounts, according to the opinion of one of the members of the Royal 
Academy of Sciences in Paris, to pure materialism, a doctrine that he detests.20 
16 Priestley, An Examination of Dr. Reid’s Inquiry Into the Human Mind on the Principles 
of Common Sense (1775); Priestley, Dr. Hartley’s theory of the Human Mind (1775).
17 Priestley, Disquisitions relating to matter and spirit (1777), p. xiii. Italics are Priestley’s.
18 Priestley, Disquisitions relating to matter and spirit (1777), p. xiv. Italics are Priestley’s.
19 Priestley, Disquisitions relating to matter and spirit (1777), p. xv.
20 Bošković to Priestley, 17 October 1778, in Varićak, “Drugi ulomak Boškovićeve kore-
spondencije” (1912), p. 208: 
“J’en ai eu la relation d’un des principaux membres de l’Accad-e Royale des Sciences, 
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More generally, it may also help us better understand the intellectual envi-
ronment of the time in which the scholar from Dubrovnik evolved.
Priestley’s Spirituality
First of all, the entire exercise could be viewed as an affirmation of one’s 
freedom of inquiry and use of reason. Indeed, in the dedication of his Disqui-
sitions to Rev. William Graham, Priestley says:
“I rejoice with you, on account of such a prevalence of free inquiry, and good 
sense in matters of religion, in the present age, as cannot fail, in the end, to over-
turn the antichristian systems that have been permitted by divine providence to 
prevail so long in the christian world, and consequently (though probably in a 
remote period) the antichristian tyrannies that have supported them.”21
However, Priestley did not consider himself as an absolute atheist like Hobbes 
may have been perceived at the time the Disquisitions were published. On the 
contrary, he wished to defend Christianity, but in a way that he saw fit. In this 
regard he said: 
“Be this as it may; I feel a great present ease in the idea of publishing my thoughts 
with the most unreserved freedom on this important subject.”22 
As such, Priestley was following a trend within Protestantism—probably a 
militant and most radical one—that directly implicates Bošković and his theory 
on matter in the worst possible manner.23
qui l’ented bien, et qui l’avoit lu. Celui-là m’a assuré, et il me l’a confirmé dans plusieurs 
conversations, que nous avons eu sur cet objet, qu’a son grand étonnement, vous ensei-
gnies dans votre ouvrage le matérialisme tout pur, et sens le moindre menagement, tout à 
decouvert: que vous pretendies le tirer de ma theorie sur la matiere, en me faissant de cette 
maniere complice d’une doctrine, que je deteste, et que j’abhorre comme impie du coté de 
la Religion, et sotte du coté de la saine philosophie.” 
21 Priestley, Disquisitions relating to matter and spirit (1777), p. ix.
22 Priestley, Disquisitions relating to matter and spirit (1777), p. xvi. Italics are Priestley’s.
23 Bošković to Priestley, 17 October 1778, in Varićak, “Drugi ulomak Boškovićeve kore-
spondencije” (1912), p. 209: 
“Vous y dites, que vous aves adopté ma theorie sur la matiere, et que vous en avois tiré des 
consequences, quoique sans dire, que ces consequences son à moi, par les quelles vous 
accusés d’erreur toutes les differentes branches de la Chretienté suivies aujours’hui, et 
sourtout l’Eglise Romaine, de la quelle je suis membre selon vos expressions mêmes, en 
resuscitant les vieilles appellations injurieuses, que vous donnes à son chef d’Antichriste. 
Est ce que vous croyés, que ce n’est pas une injure très grave, que vous me faites, de pu-
blier, que ces, que je dois regarder et que je regarde comme impietés, et sottises, sont des 
consequences necessaires de ma theorie, qui en est si eloignée comme le ciel de la terre?” 
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However, despite this fundamental difference between the Protestant Pri-
estley and the Jesuit Bošković, their intentions, as men of science, in exploring 
objective realities may have something in common. Bošković was worried 
that the obstinacy of some of his colleagues, especially those in change of the 
curriculum at the Jesuit colleges in Rome and Paris, was not only detrimental 
to science, but to religion as well. More precisely, in a letter to his elder brother 
Baro, he said:
“I preach that the greatest damage one can do to religion is to associate it with 
such things in physics that a great part of the Catholics also believe to be wrong. 
Because then, young people, convinced of the opposite, do not say: ‘religion is 
true, therefore such and such thing in physics is true,’ they instead say: ‘such 
and such a thing is wrong, therefore religion is wrong.’ And I believe that really 
in these parts [Italy and France] great damage has been done and is being done 
to religion by continuing in this way.”24 
To some extent, what Priestley’s Disquisitions intended to do was, a little bit like 
Galileo himself did, to suggest that one’s experiences of the observable world 
should be taken into consideration in any exegesis of the Christian scriptures. 
Although the extent to which that suggestion was made would have been, in 
many respects, quite reprehensible for Bošković, it was nevertheless necessary 
for getting rid of the ‘dead wood’ that obstructed the development of a con-
vergent vision of the phenomenal world acceptable to both the Church and the 
emerging scientific community of the eighteenth century. Thus, Priestley hoped, 
assuming that the dualism of the spirit and body was an example of that ‘dead 
wood,’ that Christians, even those who are dismissing him as an unbeliever, 
will realize, as he says in the Preface of his Disquisitions, that:
“the true system of revelation to be quite another thing than they had imagined 
it to be, and infinitely more consonant to the real appearances of nature, [they] 
may think it worth their while to consider it in various other lights, and attend to 
the evidence that myself and others have produced in favour of it, and so, from 
24 Ruđer Bošković to Baro Bošković, Paris, 6 April 1760, in Željko Marković, “Boškovićev 
put u Francusku g. 1759./60.,” in Željko Marković (ed.), Građa za život i rad Rudžera Boškovića, 
Knjiga II (Zagreb: Jugoslavenska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti, 1957), pp. 5–242, on p. 129: 
“Io predico, che il maggior danno, che si possa fare alla Religione è il volerla legare a cose 
fisiche tali, che da una gran parte anche di Cattolici sieno stimate false; perche allora la 
gioventù persuasa dell’opposto non dice, la Religione è vera; dunque la tal cosa in Fisica è 
vera; ma dice, la tal cosa è falsa, dunque religione è falsa; e credo, che realmente in queste 
parti si sia fatto, e si vada facendo per questa via del gran danno alla Religione.”
My translation to English.
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being infidels, in consequence of not understanding what christianity really is, 
and not sufficiently examining the evidence of it, which is generally the case, 
they may become rational christians.”25
However, by privileging reason over revelations and indirectly, by transforming 
science into an instrument of man’s emancipation, Priestley is also pushing his 
enlightenment project over a line that Bošković, and the Catholic Church for 
that matter, were not ready to cross. For them, science will always remain a 
means to make the Christian revelation more accessible and explicit. In other 
words, the role of science is to provide reasons to believe in the Christian eco-
nomy of salvation, an economy that includes—one should not forget this—an 
acceptance of the dogmas of the Church. Thus, Priestley’s use of the idea of 
unextended points rests on a complete inversion of the presuppositions un-
derlying Bošković’s religious view and even his spirituality. Bošković would 
say regarding the purpose of the study of science:
“It is marvellous how exceedingly prone the mind becomes to pass from a con-
templation of Nature herself to the contemplation of celestial things, and to give 
honour to the Divine Founder of such a mighty structure, lost in astonishment at 
His infinite Power and Wisdom and Providence, which break forth and disclose 
themselves in all directions and in all things.”26
That we actually are dealing with a form of spirituality in Priestley’s case 
can be seen in the second aspect of his motivation for embarking in his enli-
ghtenment project. When it comes to systems aiming at the transformation of 
the subject, the West has known two models. The first and dominant one has 
been produced and nourished by the various mystical orders of Christianity. 
The second, less in amplitude but nevertheless a serious contestant, comprised 
the gnostic traditions that emerged in the Mediterranean world.27 All these 
25 Priestley, Disquisitions relating to matter and spirit (1777), p. xvi. Italics are Priestley’s.
26 Boscovich, Theoria (1763), in “Epistola auctoris dedicatoria primae edizioni Viennen-
sis,” p. IX: 
“Mirum enim, quam belle ab ipsa consideratione Naturae ad caelestium rerum contem-
plationem disponitur animus, et ad ipsum Divinum tantae molis Conditorem assurgit, 
infinitam ejus Potentiam, Sapientiam, Providentiam admiratus, quae erumpunt undique, 
et ubique se produnt.” 
Cf. Boscovich, A Theory of Natural Philosophy (1966), p. 9.
27 To these two types of models, we could certainly add the Kabbalah traditions of Judaism 
and that of Sufi Islam which may, in certain areas of Europe, have exerted some influence on 
Western mysticism.
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traditions assume a division between a spiritual reality and a material one. 
However, one major difference between the Christian mystical traditions and 
the gnostic ones is that, while the former consider that a relation between the 
two realities is possible, the latter traditions categorically deny it. This denial 
of any connections between the soul and the body usually translates itself in 
most gnostic systems by overrating the value of the spiritual dimension of man, 
while disparaging if not negating the very existence of his material one and 
everything related to it. It is exactly this negative prejudice against matter that 
is bothering Priestley. Indeed, he continues in the Preface of his Disquisitions:
“The considerations suggested above tend to remove the odium which has hitherto 
lain upon matter, from its supposed necessary property of solidity, inertness, 
or sluggishness; as from this circumstance only the baseness and imperfection, 
which have been ascribed to it are derived. Since matter has, in fact, no properties 
but those of attraction and repulsion, it ought to rise in our esteem, as making 
a nearer approach to the nature of spiritual and immaterial beings, as we have 
been taught to call those which are opposed to gross matter.”28
What Priestley is therefore aiming at is an inversion of the gnostic prejudice, 
namely, the attempt at giving back to the material world a sense of nobility. But, 
even though that move could be acceptable to a Catholic Church which had to 
vehemently protect its economy of salvation from any type of gnostic influence, 
by somehow “spiritualizing” matter, Priestley makes the spiritual reality, no 
matter how it is defined, superfluous. That means that, as alluded before, the 
distinction between the material and the immaterial is also unnecessary.
If Priestley’s understanding of human nature is a swing of the pendulum 
from a worldview that disparages the material world on account of a mystical 
view of reality that assumes that only the spiritual aspect of man is real and 
worthy of attention, it appears to have gone too far in the opposite direction. 
Priestley’s criticism of the dualism of the spirit and the body may help foster 
a more positive attitude toward God’s creation, an attitude that allows one to 
enjoy without a feeling of guilt its order and beauty, it nevertheless had to rely 
on a reductionist or monist vision of reality and thereby negated an intuition, 
like that of free will, that tells us that, when dealing with oneself, others and 
the world, two distinct and autonomous principles are at work.
28 Priestley, Disquisitions relating to matter and spirit (1777), p. 17. Italics are Priestley’s.
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To some extent, Priestley’s solution appears to be a shortcut that many 
contemporary thinkers like Steven Pinker, who negates the reality of human 
consciousness,29 are adopting when confronted with problems concerning the 
nature of such non-material realities as our thoughts and intentions. Bošković 
will not be tempted, in order to resolve this problem, by resorting to such a 
reductionist shortcut. However, before we come to Bošković’s solution to this 
problem regarding the structure of what defines us as sentient beings capable 
of thinking and willing, I have to present as a necessary detour what constitutes 
some of the major pillars of his theory about the observable world.
Bošković’s Distinction Between Matter and Spirit
One of the basic intuitions we have about the universe in which we live is 
the idea that it is constituted of impenetrable objects, that is, objects that have 
such a property that they allow us to sense their presence. Without this property, 
it would be impossible to interact with the world. The experience of impene-
trability of matter led one to assume that the universe is a construction whose 
fundamental building blocks are indivisible particles of matter or atoms in the 
ancient sense of the word. Bošković showed that we do not have to resort to 
this atomistic model, as many scientists of his time including the great Newton 
did, to account for our experience of impenetrability. Instead, he concluded that 
our realities are emerging from unextended points of matter that are always 
separated by a distance,30 to which corresponds a force that is either attractive 
or repulsive. At very short distances, this force is very strong and repulsive. It 
is such a force that accounts for the impenetrability of objects. Analogically 
speaking, we can say that a universe in which the building blocks of matter lack 
solidity and where impenetrability is explained by the action of the repulsive 
29 More precisely, he would rhetorically ask whether consciousness is not some kind of 
epiphenomenon, “an impotent side effect covering over the symbols, like the lights flashing on 
a computer or the thunder that accompanies lightning?” 
Cf. Steven Pinker, How the Mind Works (London – New York – Toronto: Pinguin Books, 
1997), p. 132.
30 Boscovich, Theoria (1763), n. 7 on p. 4:
“Prima elementa materiae mihi sunt puncta prorsus indivisibilia, et inextensa, quae in 
immenso vacuo ita dispersa sunt, ut bina quaevis a se invicem distent per aliquod inter-
vallum, <…>.”
Cf. Boscovich, A Theory of Natural Philosophy (1966), p. 20.
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force at the exiguous distances,31 is what we would call today a force field.32 
As seen earlier, this is an explanation that pleased Priestley as it allowed him 
to get rid of the fundamental distinction between matter and the spirit.33
How could we then account for the activity of the mind that feels so different 
from that of the material world? Priestley, echoing some of his predecessors and 
anticipating an answer that is today more and more imposing itself, added to 
a previously cited assumption that “the power of thinking belongs to the brain 
of a man, as that of walking to his feet, or that of speaking to his tongue.”34
The lack of a fundamental distinction between matter and the spirit, or the 
brain and the mind to use a more modern formulation of the question, not only 
does it collapse the principle of being an instrument and that of the purpose 
into one single reality or “stuff,” but also assumes that what is intuitively felt 
31 On Bošković’s first concept of materiae punctum in his early treatises De viribus vivis 
(1745) and Dissertationis de lumine pars secunda (1748) see Ivica Martinović, “The Fundamental 
Deductive Chain of Bošković’s Natural Philosophy,” in Valentin Pozaić (ed.), The Philosophy 
of Science of Ruđer Bošković, Proceeding of the symposium of the Institute of Philosophy and 
Theology, S. J. (Zagreb: Institute of Philosophy and Theology, 1987), p. 65–99, on pp. 82, 88–89.
Hereafter in notes: Martinović, “The Fundamental Deductive Chain of Bošković’s Natural 
Philosophy” (1987).
Boscovich, Theoria (1763), n. 360 on p. 164:
“si enim in minimis distantiis agunt vires repulsivae, quae iis in infinitum imminutis cres-
cent in infinitum ita, ut pares sint extinguendae cuilibet velocitati utcunque magnae, <...>.”
Cf. Boscovich, A Theory of Natural Philosophy (1966), p. 134.
On Bošković’s concept of impenetrability of bodies in his early treatise De viribus vivis 
(1745) see Martinović, “The Fundamental Deductive Chain of Bošković’s Natural Philosophy” 
(1987), pp. 74–76.
32 The notion of field—which is a metaphor—used in modern physics is, of course, an ana-
chronism as far as the terminology employed by Bošković in his theory is concerned. However, if 
the term is applied in its general sense to mean a region in which a particular condition prevails, 
then, that condition being a force determined by a distance between two points of matter—or, 
most likely, a network of such forces—that notion is adequate.
33 It is very much likely that Priestley got this explanation from John Michell (1724–1793). 
Although Priestley referred to Bošković in his Disquisitions, it is really Michell’s theory of matter 
that converted him to a monist model of human nature. For some reason, Priestley just assumed 
that Bošković’s view of matter was identical to Michell’s.
On the meeting of Boscovich with Michell in Cambridge in November 1760 cf. Marković, 
Ruđe Bošković I (1968), p. 573.
Cf. John Schondelmayer Parry, John Michell’s theory of matter and Joseph Priestley’s use 
of it (London: University of London, Imperial College of Science and Technology, Department 
of History of Science and Technology, 1977), p. 9. 
Hereafter in notes: Parry, John Michell’s theory of matter and Joseph Priestley’s use of it 
(1977).
34 Priestley, Disquisitions relating to matter and spirit (1777), p. 277.
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as qualitatively different is in fact just a process of that stuff.35 To some extent, 
Priestley is here reiterating another of the arguments of the materialist Cārvākas 
that says that intelligence is also produced from only four elements, “just as the 
inebriating power is developed from the mixing of certain ingredients.”36 It is 
an argument that survived until today as we saw earlier in Pinker’s explanation 
of the phenomena of consciousness.
However, the idea of force field suggested by Bošković’s points of matter 
endowded by forces, does not necessarily imply a monist and reductionist 
model of reality and, by extension, of human nature. Most of the time, when 
Bošković refers to his points of matter, he does so by considering them as pairs. 
A simple connection involving two points of matter could be called a 
relation. According to Bošković, such a relation is defined by a mutual force 
by which the two points of matter, placed at the limits of cohaesion (limites 
cohaesionis), have a propensity to attract or to repulse each other or to maintain 
the relative distance that separates them. When two of these pairs of Bošković’s 
points of matter are combined, they could form a two-dimensional shape or a 
tridimensional structure like a regular tetrahedron.37 If the latter construction is 
solid enough, it forms a particle of the first order. We could then combine these 
particles of the first order to form a particle of the second order and so on to have 
the objects that can be perceived by our senses and with which we interact.38
What is important to note at this point is that each of these particles or 
structures have their properties defined only by the distribution of their points 
of matter placed at their limits of cohaesion.39 This means that the qualitative 
difference between objects is exclusively due to the internal distribution of the 
pairs of points of matter or the relations that constitute them:
“Two local modes of existence can constitute an infinite number of relations, 
some of one sort & some of another.”40 
35 Karis Muller, “Physics and the Deity: the ideas of R Boscovich and J Priestley,” Enlight-
enment and Dissent 12 (1993), pp. 49–62, on p. 59.
36 Sarvasiddhāntasamgraha. Cited in Radhakrishnan, A Sourcebook in Indian Philosophy 
(1973), p. 229.
37 Boscovich, Theoria (1763), n. 239 na p. 111; n. 364 na p. 166. Cf. Boscovich, A Theory 
of Natural Philosophy (1966), pp. 95, 135.
38 Boscovich, Theoria (1763), n. 239 na p. 111. Cf. Boscovich, A Theory of Natural Phi-
losophy (1966), p. 95.
39 Boscovich, Theoria (1763), n. 213 on p. 98. Cf. Boscovich, A Theory of Natural Phi-
losophy (1966), p. 83.
40 Boscovich, Theoria (1763), n. 60 on p. 27: 
“Bini locales existendi modi infinitas numero relationes possunt constituere, alii alias.”
Cf. Boscovich, A Theory of Natural Philosophy (1966), p. 36.
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We no longer need an essentialist model in which the “elements” of nature 
are endowed with qualities or even with forces, as Priestley was compelled 
to admit,41 since a force is a characteristic of the distances between points of 
matter or relations and not of the points of matter taken individually. Moreover, 
Bošković’s notion of order or level of organization implies that an object may 
consist of many of these levels, each with their own properties and operating 
principles. Thus, we have a model that reintroduces a dualism. However this 
time, it is not based on the notion of substance or stuff, but rather on the con-
cept of distribution of matter points, which could be interpreted as the mode 
of organization of matter or information. 
The use of this term to describe Bošković’s theory may be too radical 
considering the atomistic and materialistic views prevailing in the 18th century, 
a period when many scientists were still struggling with the idea of having a 
movement without physical contact. It would put the Jesuit scholar from Ra-
gusa too much ahead of his time. However, since Bošković will say that our 
experiences of reality exclusively depends on the distribution of the points of 
matter in space and time,42 I believe that I am justified in using a word that 
would appear to be a neologism at the time of Bošković, but would have been 
nevertheless acceptable in so far as it could be derived from the Latin verb in-
formo which means, among other things, “to shape in the mind” as in Cicero’s 
sentence: “notions of the gods are formed in the minds of men.”43
This distinction is crucial as it confirms what Michael Polanyi believed 
to be “at the heart of the fallacies flowing from science today”44 and to which 
Priestley has been contributing through his description of human nature. What 
Polanyi means by fallacy is the tendency to reduce the multiplicity of modes 
of organization found in any given structure to only one of these modes. For 
example, to say that the forces that regulate the functioning of the mind are the 
same as those that organize its support, namely, the brain. Using an analogy, 
41 Cf. Parry, John Michell’s theory of matter and Joseph Priestley’s use of it (1977), p. 107: 
“Priestley’s view of points surrounded by spheres of attraction and repulsion was a simpli-
fication and distortion of Boscovich’s concept of forces.”
42 “De spacio, ac tempore, ut a nobis cognoscuntur,” in: Boscovich, Theoria (1763), nn 
18–24 on pp. 273–276.
Cf. “Of Space and Time, as we know them,” in Boscovich, A Theory of Natural Philosophy 
(1966), pp. 203–205. 
43 Cf Cicero, De natura deorum 2.13: 
“in animis hominum deorum notiones informatæ sunt.”
44 Michael Polanyi and Harry Prosch, Meaning (Chicago and London: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1975), p. 29.
Hereafter in notes: Polanyi and Prosch, Meaning (1975).
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Polanyi would make this fallacy even more explicit:
“Take any question to which you want to know the answer. For example, having 
planted some primroses today, you would like to know whether they will bear 
blossoms next spring. This question is not answered by a list of atomic positions 
and velocities at some future moment on May 1 of next year. Primroses, as such, 
are lost in the topography of all the atoms. Your question can be answered only 
in terms of primroses.”45
Polanyi is here referring to Pierre-Simon Laplace’s ideal of universal knowledge 
or Laplace’s Demon which consists of a Being endowed with an intellect that 
is capable of predicting from moment to moment the evolution of a universe 
that consists of only particles in movement. It is to be noted that this idea is in 
fact Bošković’s, as he wrote in his Theoria: 
“If the law of forces were known, the position, velocity and direction of all the 
points at any given instant, it would be possible for such a mind to foresee all 
the necessary subsequent motions and states and to predict all the phenomena 
that necessarily followed from them.”46 
This is true, but again one is to be reminded that Bošković’s assertion applies to 
a level of organization isolated from its context, a context that reduces it to the 
status of an instrument. As will be seen, one level organization can be informed 
by a second level of organization which has here the status of purpose with 
regard to the first one, thus giving us a theoretical basis for understanding the 
connection between a body as an instrument and a mind as that which has the 
ability to accept and impose a purpose. Before getting to the heart of Bošković’s 
formulation of this theoretical basis, one more element of his system needs to 
be presented, namely, his notion of a center of gravity.
Even if thinking about the objects of this world in terms of force fields or 
information may be baffling, it does not inhibit our ability to manipulate them. 
That ability has been cultivated on account of having had, from the time we 
have used objects as tools, an intuitive knowledge of another universal property 
45 Polanyi and Prosch, Meaning (1975), p. 29.
46 Boscovich, Theoria (1763), n. 385 on p. 177:
“Cognita autem lege virium, et positione, ac velocitate, et directione punctorum omnium 
dato tempore, posset ejusmodi mens prævidere omnes futuros necessarios motus, ac status, 
et omnia Naturæ phænomena necessaria, ab iis utique pendentia, atque prædicere.”
Cf. Boscovich, A Theory of Natural Philosophy (1966), p. 141. 
The idea that one is be able to predict the evolution of a system if we were to know its 
initial conditions is also known as the ‘Laplacian determinism.’ According to John Barrow, this 
idea should have been attributed to Bošković. Cf. John Barrow, New Theories of Everything: the 
Quest for Ultimate Explanation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 63. 
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in addition to that of impenetrability, namely, that all objects have a center of 
gravity and only one, a fact that, according to Bošković, many people often 
omit.47 It is the awareness of such a center that makes it possible to maximize 
the instrumental value of these objects because all the mass of an object beha-
ves as though it is concentrated at that center. Thus, by controlling the center 
of gravity of an object, one controls the entire object no matter how its mass 
is distributed or organized. This is a well-known fact as it emerges from very 
common experiences. 
However, not so well-known is the idea that a center of gravity presents an 
ontological oddity, at least from the point of view of a reductionist and positivist 
epistemology. We have the knowledge of its existence since, as just alluded 
to, without such knowledge no successful interaction with the world would be 
possible. However, it can never be directly observed. Like the distance between 
two points of matter, it is always tacitly known. Moreover, when we are seizing 
it, we never make direct contact with it, but rather with the part of the object 
that approximately embodies it.
Thus, the part of the object that embodies a center of gravity has a double 
status: it is a connector with the elements belonging to its own level of orga-
nization as well as with the level that instrumentalizes it. In other words—this 
is what Laplace’s model did not consider—one element of a system may be 
the embodiment of a force whose origin is located outside that system as it is 
related to an element that belongs to another system. Because of this external 
connection, the uncertainty with regard to the evolution of a given system 
is considerably increased, at least from the point of view of elements of this 
system. In fact, one has to consider the organization of the external system, a 
system that can only be manipulated by other external systems. It is this idea of 
double status for a center of gravity that finally brings us to Bošković’s original 
solution to the problem of the connection between the mind and the body.
Bošković’s Solution to the Mind-Body Problem
Bošković’s answer to the mind-body problem is to be found in an appendix 
to his Theoria entitled “De anima et Deo” (“On the Soul and God”).48 He also 
47 Boscovich, Theoria (1763), n. 240 on p. 112:
“tum demonstrabo accuratissime, in quavis massa haberi aliquod gravitatis centrum, idque 
unicum, quod quidem passim omittere solent, et perperam; <…>.” 
Cf. Boscovich, A Theory of Natural Philosophy (1966), p. 96.
48 “Appendix ad Metaphysicam pertinens de anima, et Deo,” in Boscovich, Theoria (1763), 
nn. 525–558 on pp. 248–263.
Cf. “Appendix relating to Metaphysics: the Mind and God,” in Boscovich, A Theory of 
Natural Philosophy (1966), pp. 187–196. 
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provided the basis of such an answer at the end of the first part of his Theoria 
which deals with the presentation and proofs of his law of forces where, an-
ticipating Priestley’s reductionist move, he refuted the idea that his points of 
matter are to be equated with spirits.
In short, Bošković argued that the forces that regulate our mental processes 
and which are consequently responsible for the connection between the mind and 
the body, are not the same as the ones that are responsible for the movements 
of the material world, namely the propensities for attraction and repulsion, and 
inertia. In fact, if there were substances endowed with these forces and capable 
of thinking and willing, which are the properties of the spirits, they would be 
neither material nor spiritual.49 Thus, according to Bošković, the connection 
between the mind and the body is realized following three distinct laws or modes 
of action. The first two are completely different from the law that regulates the 
matter points (materiae puncta) that constitute the body as well as the mind, 
whereas the third one agrees to some extent with it.50
The first two modes of action correspond respectively to the local motions 
of our organic body or part of it and to the non-local movements of our mind 
responsible for exciting our ideas and acts of will. Here, we find reciprocity 
between the mind and the body in which the former may excite the latter and 
vice versa. However, this reciprocal action is only possible when there is an 
alignment (mutua positio partium) between the mind and the parts of the body 
so that, when there is a lesion in the brain, it ceases to operate. Bošković also 
believed that the first two modes of action are of two types, namely, one when 
the connection is necessary and a second when it is free.51 It is in this context 
that he addressed the mechanism of free will and the determinism of our nervous 
system as well as our inclinations. In this regard, he said that it is possible that, 
Hereafter in notes: Boscovich, “Appendix de anima et Deo” (1763); Boscovich, “Appendix 
on the Mind and God” (1966).
49 Boscovich, Theoria (1763), n. 155 on p. 70: 
“Si possibile sit illud substantiæ genus, quod et hujusmodi vires activas habeat cum inertia 
conjunctas, et simul cogitare possit, ac velle; id quidem nec corpus erit, nec spiritus, <…>.”
Cf. Boscovich, A Theory of Natural Philosophy (1966), p. 64.
50 Boscovich, “Appendix de anima et Deo” (1763), n. 531 on p. 250: 
“Porro commercium illud inter animam, et corpus, quod unionem appellamus, tria habet 
inter se diversa legum genera, quarum bina sunt prorsus diversa ab ea etiam, quæ habetur 
inter materiæ puncta, tertium in aliquo genere convenit cum ipsa, sed ita longe in aliis 
plurimis ab ea distat, ut a materiali mechanismo penitus remotum sit.” 
Cf. Boscovich, “Appendix on the Mind and God” (1966), p. 188.
51 Boscovich, “Appendix de anima et Deo” (1763), n. 532 on p. 251: 
“Sunt autem ejusmodi legum duo genera: alterum genus est illud, cujus nexus est necessa-
rius, alterum, cujus nexus est liber:”
Cf. Boscovich, “Appendix on the Mind and God” (1966), p. 188.
Francis Brassard110
on account of a certain law, there is an inclination that renders some actions 
easier to do than others. It nevertheless remains that we dispose of a faculty 
called volition which allows us to counteract this inclination by giving something 
which by itself would not be able to overcome the force of that inclination.52
Moving on to the third mode of action, Bošković tried to make more explicit 
this notion of alignment between a mental structure and the body. This third 
mode of operation shares an important characteristic of the law regulating the 
movements of the material and inert world, which is the fact that the mind must 
occupy a certain position with regard to the body and its organs to maintain an 
organism alive.53 However, it greatly differs from the law of forces that regulates 
matter as its range does not extend to infinity and that it does not alternate from 
a propensity to attract to a propensity to repulse and vice versa, propensities that 
change according to distances and occur at points serving as limits. It is to be 
noted that Bošković made these claims only on the basis of having no indices 
to the contrary.54 He added that, again based on an absence of observed indices, 
perhaps there is no propensity to repulsion with regard to a point of matter at 
very short distances so that it is possible to assume that a spiritual substance 
is capable of compenetration with matter. This means that it has the ability to 
occupy with point of matter the same point of space at the same time.55
Finally, Bošković reiterated the idea that the forces enabling this connection 
are not eternal and immutable as there are dependent on a specific organiza-
tion of the body. And to cover all possibilities, he added that these forces do 
52 Boscovich, “Appendix de anima et Deo” (1763), n. 532 on p. 251: 
“licet fieri possit, ut certa lege ad id inclinent, et actus alios aliis faciliores reddant, manente 
tamen semper in animo, in ipsa illa ejus facultate, quam dicimus voluntatem, potestate liber-
rima eligendi illud etiam, contra quod inclinatur, et efficiendi, ut ex mera sua determinatione 
præponderet etiam illud, quod independenter ab ea minorem habet vim.”
Cf. Boscovich, “Appendix on the Mind and God” (1966), p. 189.
53 Boscovich, “Appendix de anima et Deo” (1763), n. 533 on p. 251: 
“Tertium legum genus convenit cum lege mutua punctorum in hoc genere, quod ad motum 
localem pertinet animæ ipsius, ac certam ejus positionem ad corpus, & ad certam organorum 
dispositionem.” 
Cf. Boscovich, “Appendix on the Mind and God” (1966), p. 189.
54 Boscovich, “Appendix de anima et Deo” (1763), n. 533 on p. 252: “vel saltem nullum 
earum rerum habemus indicium.”
Cf. Boscovich, “Appendix on the Mind and God” (1966), p. 189.
55 Boscovich, “Appendix de anima et Deo” (1763), n. 533 on p. 252: 
“cum potius ipsa [= anima] compenetrari cum materia posse videatur; nam ex phaenomenis 
nec illud certo colligi posse arbitror, an cum ullo materiae puncto compenetretur.”
Cf. Boscovich, “Appendix on the Mind and God” (1966), p. 189.
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not interact with other minds so that there is, following the law of cohesion 
by which the sensitivity of matter is generated, no impenetrability between 
these minds. Thus, Bošković concluded that, based on such differences, the 
law concerning the union between the mind and the body greatly differs from 
a material mechanism.56
By assuming that the nature of the connection between a material structure 
and a spiritual one is likely to be that of compenetration,57 Bošković is fulfilling 
the two conditions necessary for an organism to function properly. These are: 1. 
these two types of structure have to be close to each other, and 2. they have to 
be somehow aligned. What remains to be discussed is their spacial organization 
or to answer the following question: where would an inorganic mind be situated 
with regard to a bodily structure? If recent discoveries in neuroscience allow us 
to pinpoint locations in the brain where certain cognitive activities are taking 
place, it is still an open question as to account for the plasticity and adaptability 
of the brain to compensate or relocate the centers of these activities when the 
original locations have been damaged. Thus, what is yet to be determined is 
whether the mind is spread all over the brain or even the body, whether it is 
localized in specific parts of the brain or are we dealing with a combination of 
both possibilities? The last alternative may also include the time factor where 
certain cognitive activities pass from a local position to a wider spread within 
the brain thus favoring adaptability in the case of a lesion.
As mentioned at the outset of this article, the question of spacial organi-
zation regarding the mind and the body preoccupied many thinkers preceding 
and contemporary to Bošković. One prevalent answer was the one suggested 
by Descartes who situated the mind in a small part of the body called the pineal 
gland. Other thinkers, also on the basis of the fact that some people claimed 
to feel pain in their fingers even when they had their hand cut, argued that the 
mind must be diffused over the entire body. Bošković rejected these interpre-
tations on the ground that the evidence is not convincing. In fact, he was of the 
56 Boscovich, “Appendix de anima et Deo” (1763), n. 533 on p. 252: 
“satis luculenter patet, quam longe hæc etiam lex pertinens ad unionem animæ cum corpore 
a materiali mechanismo distet, et penitus remota sit.”
Cf. Boscovich, “Appendix on the Mind and God” (1966), p. 189.
57 However, as a word of caution, Bošković says that it is impossible to know just “from 
the phenomena” whether there is such a compenetration. Cf. Boscovich, “Appendix de anima et 
Deo” (1763), n. 533 on p. 252: 
“nam ex phaenomenis nec illud certo colligi posse arbitror, an [anima] cum ullo materiae 
puncto compenetretur.”
Cf. Boscovich, “Appendix on the Mind and God” (1966), p. 189. 
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opinion that the simple observation of the phenomena will never by sufficient 
to answer with certainty the present question.58
For him, the heart of the problem lies in having to translate the general 
laws effecting the connection between the various types of mental and brain 
activity, on the one hand, and all physical structures involved in our actions 
on the other, into very precise causal events affecting the points of matter. In 
other words, Bošković is looking for a solution which is, although impossible 
to confirm by observation, naturalistic, that is, one that is based on a theory that 
can explain the behavior of the phenomenal world. And even if we were able 
to identify these causal events, we would still need a very deep understanding 
of the geometry involved and a tremendous power of computation at a time 
when we are still struggling “to determine all the motions of three little masses, 
which act upon one another with forces that are known.”59
Despite this methodological limitation, Bošković ventures a few hypotheses 
that are in agreement with his vision of reality as exposed in his Theoria, more 
particularly, the notions of the center of gravity and that of levels of organization 
as presented earlier. He asked whether the mind is present simultaneously in a 
certain number of points following the principle of virtual extension. According 
to that principle, which is one way of describing the double status of a center 
of gravity, it is possible to have one single point serving as a limit of a reality 
encompassing a space or a structure that is defined by a given number of ele-
ments. Using the analogy of time and space, we could say that one moment 
of time, as one limit of an interval of time, affects simultaneously a group of 
points of matter forming a given space.
Consequently, the rational mind, about which it has not been demonstrated 
that it does not exist as merely a single, simple and non-extended point of the 
body, maintains the same position from which it puts forth some kind of force 
via a center of gravity into the remaining points of the body encompassed by that 
center.60 We can here think of a kite which has, as a material structure a center 
that is connected to a thread that allows an external user to control its behavior. 
58 Boscovich, “Appendix de anima et Deo” (1763), n. 534 on p. 252:
“Ubi sit animæ sedes, ex puris phænomenis certo nosse omnino non possumus.” 
Italics are Bošković’s.
Cf. Boscovich, “Appendix on the Mind and God” (1966), p. 189.
59 Boscovich, “Appendix de anima et Deo” (1763), n. 535 on p. 253: 
“At illa omnia nobis incognita sunt, nec ad illud adeo sublime Geometriæ genus adspirare 
nobis licet, qui nondum penitus determinare potuimus motus omnes trium etiam massularum, 
quæ certis viribus in se invicem agant.” 
Cf. Boscovich, “Appendix on the Mind and God” (1966), p. 190.
60 In fact, the body is controlled by a hierarchy of levels of organization starting from the 
neural network, the nerves, the muscles and probably many other levels the biologist, chemist and 
physicist know about, each level being directed by its encompassing level via a center of gravity.
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According to Bošković, the communication between the mind and the body 
would consist of these forces, some of which, as mentioned before, are voluntary 
and others are involuntary.61 Again, that communication is possible only if we 
have a compenetration at a center of gravity, a compenetration that can only 
occur between two entities of a different kind or two levels of organization. 
As such, the relation between the mind and the body is analogically similar to 
that we have with objects we manipulate to perform actions. It is, according 
to Bošković, the model that also represents the relation between God and His 
creation.62 But these are considerations, as Bošković himself said, that “exceed 
the scope of natural philosophy.”63
Conclusion: Beyond the Points of the Body and Mind
We started the present discussion by analyzing Priestley’s model of reality, 
a model that reduces the world to one single substance by collapsing the duali-
sm between the mind and body. Using the model of levels of organization, we 
tried to rescue that dualism. However, and to play the devil’s advocate, we may 
argue that Priestley’s monism reflects an intuition that says that there should 
be a common denominator or a continuity between the various types of reality 
with and by which we interact, that is, between an observer and the observed 
world. Such continuity is necessary at least to account for our ability to interact 
with the world and to reshape it, an ability that can certainly by extended to all 
living organisms, albeit to a degree somewhat proportional to their complexity. 
The question thus remains to define the nature of this ‘discontinuous continuity’ 
or to see how we could have ‘unity in diversity.’
This paradox may be solved by supposing that the very “stuff” of our univer-
se is, as alluded before, information or that by which we are able to experience 
meaning and which can be added to an existing structure so that it acquires a 
higher degree of complexity, like building a computer by using common raw 
materials. This means that the ability to understand and to transform the world 
is already present in the very worlds we understand and transform. Bošković’s 
61 Boscovich, Theoria (1763), n. 85 on p. 39: 
“exerendo inde vires quasdam in reliqua corporis puncta rite disposita, in quibus viribus 
partim necessariis, et partim liberis, stet ipsum animæ commercium cum corpore.”
Cf. Boscovich, “Appendix on the Mind and God” (1966), p. 44.
62 Boscovich, “Appendix de anima et Deo” (1763), n. 537 on p. 254: 
“ut et Deus per infinitam Immensitatem suam præsens est punctis infinitis spatii (et ille 
quidem omnibus omnino), sive in iis materia sit, sive sint vacua.” 
Cf. Boscovich, “Appendix on the Mind and God” (1966), p. 190.
63 Boscovich, “Appendix de anima et Deo” (1763), n. 558 on p. 263: 
“Sed ea jam Philosophiæ Naturalis fines excedunt, <…>.” 
Cf. Boscovich, “Appendix on the Mind and God” (1966), p. 196.
Francis Brassard114
Theoria, with its notions of points of matter, center of gravity, compenetration 
and level of organization would easily lend itself to such an explanation of what 
ultimately constitutes our reality. To some extent, his vision of reality anticipa-
tes the law of consciousness and complexity suggested by Pierre Teilhard de 
Chardin.64 From this perspective, the assertion that information, and perhaps 
consciousness, is the basic “stuff” of our universe would give us a middle 
way between a monist and a dualist view of human nature. If it is so, the next 
question would be: what makes information to “fossilize” itself into what we 
call matter? To answer that question, we would need more than Bošković’s 
Theoria. But again, it may not be that far in suggesting a direction in which 
we could start our exploration.
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Pred problemom odnosa duše i tijela: 
usporedba između rješenjā Josepha Priestleya 
i Ruđera Josipa Boškovića
Sažetak
Problem odnosa duše i tijela oduvijek je bio velika tema filozofā. Nakon renesanse 
raspri o ovom problemu pridružili su se i prirodoznanstvenici. Ovaj se članak usmje-
rava na prinose dvojice protagonista prirodne filozofije 18. stoljeća: Josepha Priestleya 
i Ruđera Josipa Boškovića. Dobro je poznata činjenica da se Bošković suprotstavio 
Priestleyevu rješenju ovoga problema. Manje su poznati religiozni ili duhovni razlo-
zi zašto se Priestley poslužio Boškovićevim pojmom neprotežnih točaka tvari kao 
osnovom za svoje rješenje. 
Nakon izlaganja tih razloga i utvrđivanja njihove povezanosti sa specifičnim sku-
pom pretpostavaka na kojima počivaju monizmi, ovaj članak promatra Boškovićevo 
vlastito rješenje koje počiva na dualističkom pogledu na ljudsku narav, rješenje koje se 
oslanja na tri pojma: silu koja se pojavljuje između međusobno udaljenih neprotežnih 
točaka tvari, težište i pronicanje, kako su ti pojmovi raspravljeni u njegovu djelu The-
oria philosophiae naturalis, redacta ad unicam legem virium in natura existentium i 
napose u njegovu dodatku »Appendix pertinens ad metaphysicam de anima et Deo«. 
Ključne riječi: Ruđer Josip Bošković, Joseph Priestley, problem odnosa duše i 
tijela, monizam, dualizam, pojam duše, ustroj tvarnoga svijeta.
